

## STRENGTHENING NATO'S INTEGRATED AIR AND MISSILE DEFENCE

### RESOLUTION 492\*

The Assembly,

1. **Recognising** that Russia's illegal, unprovoked and unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine, which constituted the expansion of Russia's armed aggression that has been ongoing since February of 2014, has fundamentally changed Euro-Atlantic security and forced NATO Allies to adjust to a more dangerous security environment and acquire the capabilities necessary to defend their populations and territory;
2. **Alarmed** by Russia's rapid missile arsenal modernisation and expansion, including new dual-capable ballistic, cruise and aeroballistic missiles designed specifically to hold NATO populations and territories at risk, and the growth of its production capacity to sustain its reckless, brutal and illegal air campaigns against Ukrainian cities, civilian populations, and armed forces;
3. **Very concerned** about significant advancements and investments by Russia, China, and North Korea in their nuclear arsenals and capabilities, including a Russian nuclear weapon in development designed to target space infrastructure, which, coupled with its reckless nuclear rhetoric and announced nuclear missile deployments to its ally, Belarus, represents a clear effort to shift the global balance of strategic power;
4. **Recognising** that Russia's use of nuclear rhetoric and manipulation through threats and escalation tactics aims to destabilise Allied unity, and **reaffirming** that such actions must not deter the Alliance from providing sustained and robust support to Ukraine;
5. **Clear-eyed** about the growing forms of opportunistic military cooperation among autocratic regimes in Moscow, Beijing, Tehran, and Pyongyang, which are particularly focused on the exchange of missile and drone capabilities and know-how, and **alarmed** these forms of cooperation are extending to non-state actors, further escalating existing conflicts and conventional and nuclear risks across the globe;
6. **Alert** to the central role advanced missiles and drones already play in a growing number of conflicts in the Alliance's near neighbourhood, particularly in Russia's massive and cruel war of aggression against Ukraine, involving weapons from Iran and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and North Korean troops, and now using a strategic ballistic missile that could be a carrier of weapons of mass destruction;
7. **Vigilant** to the reality this growing complexity of air threats presents a clear and pressing challenge to NATO Allies' existing air and missile defence systems and forces partners to use their air defence forces to shoot down Russian military targets over their territory;
8. **Troubled** by Russia's repeated violation of arms control frameworks and counter-proliferation initiatives, such as the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), and

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**understanding** that the continued erosion of arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation frameworks and norms undermines strategic stability;

9. **Commending** Ukraine for its heroic territorial defence against Russia's air campaign despite its significant disadvantages in troops and materiel;

10. **Urging** Allies to learn from Ukraine's capable defence against Russia's complex air war, especially the dispersal and manoeuvrability of its air defences and innovative use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and as direct-attack munitions;

11. **Recalling** that Integrated Air and Missile Defence (IAMD) is fundamental to the Alliance's core task of deterrence and defence and, therefore, vital to collective defence, in order to avoid losing NATO's competitive edge to actors who seek to create international instability and challenge the rules-based international order;

12. **Noting** that underinvestment in Allied air and missile defence capabilities after the end of the Cold War has undermined Allied security in the current, unstable and unpredictable security environment;

13. **Acknowledging** that Allies must now make significant investments in NATO IAMD in order to meet the new baseline for defence and deterrence agreed upon at the Madrid and Vilnius Summits;

14. **Welcoming** the operationalisation of the missile defence base in Redzikowo, Poland, as a significant milestone in strengthening NATO's IAMD capabilities and enhancing the Alliance's deterrence and defence posture on its eastern flank;

15. **Welcoming** multilateral initiatives to strengthen and modernise Allied IAMD, notably the European Sky Shield Initiative, as well as the development and acquisitions of air and missile defence systems by individual Allies;

16. **Also welcoming** Allies' stated intention at the Washington Summit to update NATO's IAMD policy, based on a 360-degree approach to increase readiness, responsiveness, and integration through new initiatives, such as the IAMD Rotational Model across the Euro-Atlantic area with an initial focus on the eastern flank;

17. **Stressing** that all air and missile defence initiatives should meet capability targets specified by the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP) and that new assets should be interoperable with other NATO systems;

18. **Encouraging** Allies to invest in and become early adopters of advanced missile defence technologies, including directed energy weapons, space-based sensors, and more effective interceptors;

19. **Emphasising** that a stronger and more capable NATO IAMD architecture means not only more launchers, interceptors, radars and sensors, but also a more integrated NATO command and control (C2) network to link national assets into a coherent Alliance-wide system;

20. **Affirming** that a modernised, 360-degree NATO IAMD is a strategic imperative given the deterioration of the Alliance's security environment;

21. **Understanding** fully that missile defence can complement the role of nuclear weapons in deterrence; it cannot substitute them;

22. **Underscoring** that NATO must remain united in its response to Russia's aggression and continue to support Ukraine while demonstrating that manipulation, threats, and coercion will not deter the Alliance from upholding international law and defending democratic values;

23. **URGES** member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:

- a. to eliminate, either through individual investment or cooperative initiatives, all single points of failure across the Alliance's eastern flank, where many layers of air defences are either ageing, incompatible, legacy Soviet equipment, or non-existent;
  - b. to upgrade their air defences to NATO standards and ensure they are interoperable and integrated within a wider IAMD architecture that is tailored to address all air and missile threats emanating from all strategic directions from state and non-state actors;
  - c. to build on the commitments made in Madrid to implement NATO's air and missile defence as a crucial prerequisite to meeting the standards of performance outlined at the Vilnius Summit, and to maintain the balance of defensive and offensive systems that underpin NATO's deterrence and defence posture;
  - d. to increase defence spending to 2% of GDP as a baseline, with at least 20% allocated to investments and new equipment purchases, to increase Allies' capabilities and meet the deterrence and defence standards to which they have pledged, and to recognise that, in certain cases, substantially higher spending will be necessary to satisfy Article 3 of the Washington Treaty;
  - e. to stimulate production across Allies' industrial bases by sending consistent demand signals, making necessary investments, and lowering barriers to defence cooperation between Allies;
  - f. to adapt the Alliance's air and missile defence architecture to the state and non-state threats it faces, particularly to the clear and present challenge of Russia;
  - g. to consider whether the Alliance's ballistic missile mission should be adapted to handle the realities of the current security environment;
  - h. to ensure that Allies have lower-tier capabilities to address a range of non-strategic air and missile threats;
  - i. to learn from Ukraine's heroic self-defence, particularly the critical role of dispersed and mobile air defence systems, and incorporate these lessons into Allied missile defence practice;
  - j. to advance innovation in UAVs as both battlefield managers, direct attack munitions, and in offensive and defensive roles;
  - k. to hone their ability to exercise IAMD missions, increase their participation in relevant NATO IAMD entities, including the NATO IAMD Centre of Excellence in Crete, and ensure these missions' seamless integration into the Alliance's broader deterrence and defence posture.
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